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Abstract
For a change in prices, the common-scaling social cost-of-living index is the equal scaling
of every individual's expenditure level needed to restore the level of social welfare to its
pre-change value. This index does not, in general, satisfy two standard index-number tests.
The reversal test requires the index value for the reverse change to be the reciprocal of the
original index. And the circular test requires the product of index values for successive price
changes to be equal to the index value for the whole change. We show that both tests are
satised if and only if the Bergson-Samuelson indirect social-welfare function is homothetic
in prices, a condition which does not require individual preferences to be homothetic. If indi-
vidual preferences are homothetic, however, stronger conditions on the Bergson-Samuelson
indirect must be satised. Given these results, we ask whether the restrictions are empiri-
cally reasonable and nd, in the case that individual preferences are not homothetic, that
the restrictions make little dierence to estimates of the index.
1 Thanks to Charlie Blackorby and Walter Bossert for comments and assistance with proofs, and to the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for research support.Recently, Thomas Crossley and Krishna Pendakur [2009] have proposed a social cost-of-living
index that is a departure from the standard ones. For a price change, their common-scaling
social cost-of-living index is the equal scaling of every individual's expenditure level needed
to restore the pre-change level of social welfare. Using a social-welfare function, the index
takes account of a social attitude towards inequality of well-being when assessing the social
cost of price changes.
Like the common-scaling index, the other general ethical index, due to Pollak [1980,
1981], uses a social-welfare function. The value of Pollak's index depends on a reference level
of social welfare and is equal to the ratio of total expenditure needed to achieve that level
after the change to total expenditure needed before the change. Blackorby and Donaldson
[1983] investigate conditions under which the index is independent of the reference level of
social welfare, given that the social-welfare function is additively separable.
The commonly used plutocratic index is the share-weighted value of individual cost-
of-living indexes. It is equal to the ratio of the total cost of keeping each person at his
or her pre-change utility level to total expenditures before the change. Given appropriate
social-welfare and individual utility functions, the common-scaling index is the plutocratic
index (see Section 2). The arithmetic mean of individual indexes is also used, but has no
desirable ethical properties.
The Pollak and common-scaling indexes are generalizations of individual cost-of-living
indexes, which can be dened as the ratio of expenditures needed to achieve a reference level
of individual utility, parallel to Pollak's index, or as the scaling of individual expenditure
need to preserve the pre-change utility level, parallel to the common-scaling index. Because
cost-of-living adjustments are typically made with across-the-board percentage changes, the
common-scaling index may be more attractive.
Suppose that an economy consists of n single adults, where n is a positive integer, with
m goods, m  2. Individual i has a continuous indirect utility function V i:Rm+1
++ ! R
which is increasing in expenditure, weakly decreasing in prices, and homogeneous of degree
zero.
The social-welfare function W:V 1(Rm+1
++ ):::V n(Rm+1
++ ) ! R is assumed to be con-
tinuous, increasing (Pareto-inclusive), and symmetric (anonymous). The Bergson-Samuelson
indirect social-welfare function is B:Rm+n






where p = (p1;:::;pm) is the (common) price vector and x = (x1;:::;xn) is the vector
of individual expenditures. B is homogeneous of degree zero. Because W is increasing in
individual utilities which are, in turn, increasing in individual expenditures, B is increasing
in x.
Suppose prices change from pb to pa (b for `before,' a for `after'), and x gives the
vector of individual expenditures corresponding to pb (the `before' expenditure vector). The
common-scaling social cost-of-living index I:R2m+n
++ ! R is written I(pa;pb;x) and dened
by










I(pa;pb;x) =  , B(pb;x) = B(pa;x): (3)
From the denition of I and the fact that B is increasing in x, I(pa;pb;x) = 1 if and only
if B(pb;x) = B(pa;x), I(pa;pb;x) > 1 if and only if B(pb;x) > B(pa;x), and I(pa;pb;x) < 1
if and only if B(pb;x) < B(pa;x) for all (pa;pb;x) 2 R2m+n
++ .
In this paper, we investigate the conditions needed to ensure that the index satises
two standard index-number tests: the reversal and circular tests. Suppose that the index
reports that prices have increased by 5% (index value = 1.05) when prices change from  p to
~ p and 5% when prices change from ~ p to ^ p. Then, allowing for compounding, it is reasonable
to expect the index to report an increase of 10.25% (index value = (1.05)2) for a change
from  p to ^ p. This consistency condition is captured by the circular test. The reversal test,
which is implied by the circular test, requires the index value for a change from pb to pa
to be the reciprocal of the value for a change from pa to pb. We also investigate conditions
needed to make the index independent of expenditures and consider the case of homothetic
individual preferences as well as the general case. Finally, we ask whether the restriction for
satisfaction of the tests is empirically reasonable.
In the general case, we demonstrate that the common-scaling index satises either test
if and only if the Bergson-Samuelson indirect is homothetic in prices. This condition does
not require homotheticity in expenditures, nor does it require individual preferences to be
homothetic. When preferences are homothetic, however, satisfaction of the tests together
with a preference-diversity condition does require the Bergson-Samuelson indirect to be
homothetic in prices and homothetic in expenditures.
1. Homogeneity Properties of the Index
Because B is homogeneous of degree zero, the common-scaling index always satises several
homogeneity properties.
Theorem 1: The common-scaling cost-of-living index I is homogeneous of degree zero,
homogeneous of degree one in its rst argument, and jointly homogeneous of degree zero in
its second and third arguments.
Proof: For all (pa;pb;x) 2 R2m+n












From the denition of I,
I(pa;pb;x) = I(pa;pb;x); (6)
2and I is homogenous of degree zero.






By the denition of I,
I(pa;pb;x)= = I(pa;pb;x); (8)
so
I(pa;pb;x) = I(pa;pb;x); (9)

























and I is homogeneous of degree minus one in (pb;x).
As might be expected, the common-scaling index is not, in general, homogeneous of de-
gree minus one in pb. The following section discusses the relationship between that property
and satisfaction of the index-number tests.
2. The Reversal and Circular Tests
It is reasonable to require the value of the index for the change from pb to pa to be the
reciprocal of the value for the reverse change. This condition is called the reversal test.
Reversal Test: A common-scaling index I satises the reversal test if and only if I(pa;pb;x) =
1=I(pb;pa;x) for all (pa;pb;x) 2 R2m+n
++ .
Theorem 2 presents three conditions, each of which characterizes a common-scaling
index that satises the reversal test. Two are conditions on the index, namely that it is
homogeneous of degree minus one in its second argument or, equivalently, homogeneous
of degree zero in its third argument. The third condition requires the Bergson-Samuelson
indirect to be (conditionally) homothetic in prices.
Theorem 2: If I is a common-scaling index,
3(a) I satises the reversal test if and only if it is homogeneous of degree minus one in
its second argument;
(b) I satises the reversal test if and only if it is homogeneous of degree zero in its
third argument;
(c) I satises the reversal test if and only if the associated Bergson-Samuelson indirect
B is homothetic in prices.
Proof: (1) First, we use Theorem 1 to show that I is homogeneous of degree minus one in
its second argument if and only if it is homogeneous of degree zero in its third argument. If
I is homogeneous of degree minus one pb then, using Theorem 1,
I(pa;pb;x) = I(pa=;pb=;x) = I(pa=;pb;x) = I(pa;pb;x); (13)
where the rst equality follows from homogeneity of degree zero in all variables, the second
follows from homogeneity of degree minus one in I's second argument, and the third follows
from homogeneity of degree one in I's rst argument.
If I is homogeneous of degree zero in x, then, using the result of Theorem 1,




where the rst inequality follows from I's homogeneity of degree zero in all its variables and
the second inequality follows from I's homogeneity of degree one in its rst argument and
homogeneity of degree zero in x. Consequently I is homogeneous of degree minus one in its
second argument.
(2) Next we show that, if I satises the reversal test, it is homogeneous of degree minus one
















and I is homogeneous of degree minus one in its second argument.
(3) The result of part (2) can be used to show that, if I satises the reversal test, B must
be homothetic in prices. Suppose I satises the reversal test. From Theorem 1 and part
(2), I must be homogeneous of degree zero in its rst and second arguments. Then, for any
( p; ^ p;x) 2 R2m+n
++ and any  2 R++,
B( p;x) = B(^ p;x); (17)
if and only if
I(^ p;  p;x) = 1: (18)
4Because I is homogeneous of degree zero in its rst two arguments
I(^ p;^ p;x) = 1; (19)
so
B( p;x) = B(^ p;x) (20)
and B is homothetic in prices.
(4) In this nal part of the proof, we show that homotheticity of B in prices implies that
I satises the reversal test. Suppose, therefore, that B is homothetic in prices. By the
denition of I, for any ( p; ^ p;x) 2 R2m+n



































and the reversal test is satised.
The circular test requires the product of indexes for successive changes to be equal to
the index for the complete change.
Circular Test: A common-scaling index I satises the circular test if and only if
I( p; ~ p;x)I(~ p; ^ p;x) = I( p; ^ p;x) for all ( p; ~ p; ^ p;x) 2 R3m+n
++ .
If  p and ^ p are both set equal to pa and ~ p is set equal to pb, the circular test's condition
becomes the reversal test's condition. Consequently, satisfaction of the circular test implies
satisfaction of the reversal test.
If a common-scaling index satises the reversal test, Theorem 3 demonstrates that it
also satises the circular test.
5Theorem 3: I satises the reversal test if and only if it satises the circular test.
Proof: Suppose I satises the reversal test and, for any ( p; ~ p; ^ p;x) 2 R3m+n
++ , let I( p; ~ p;x) =
  and I(~ p; ^ p;x) = ^ . Then
B(~ p;x) = B( p;  x) (26)
and
B(^ p;x) = B(~ p; ^ x): (27)
Because B is homogeneous of degree zero, (26) implies
B(~ p;x) = B( p= ;x) (28)
and (27) implies
B(^ p;x) = B(~ p=^ ;x): (29)
Because I satises the reversal test, B is homothetic in p by Theorem 2, and, therefore,
(28) implies
B(~ p=^ ;x) = B( p= ^ ;x); (30)
and (28) and (29) imply
B(^ p;x) = B( p= ^ ;x): (31)
Homogeneity of B implies
B(^ p;x) = B( p;  ^ x) (32)
and, as a consequence, I( p; ^ p;x) =  ^  = I( p; ~ p;x)I(~ p; ^ p;x), and the circular test is satised.
Because satisfaction of the reversal test is implied by satisfaction of the circular test, if
I satises the circular test, it satises the reversal test.
Homogeneity of degree zero of B together with homotheticity of B in p might be thought
to imply homotheticity of B in x. That is the case if n = 1.
Theorem 4: If n = 1, I satises the reversal test if and only if the individual's preferences
are homothetic, with V 1(p;x1) = 1 
1(p)x1

, where 1 is homogeneous of degree minus one
and  is increasing.





, V 1 must be homothetic in p. For any ( p; ^ p;x1),
V 1( p;x1) = V 1(^ p;x1) , V 1( p;x1) = V 1(^ p;x1) , V 1( p;x1=) = V 1(^ p;x1=) (33)
for any  > 0, where the third equality follows from homogeneity of degree zero of V 1.
Setting  = 1=x1, (33) becomes
V 1( p;x1) = V 1(^ p;x1) , V 1( p;1) = V 1(^ p;1): (34)
Because V 1 is homothetic in p, it is ordinally equivalent to the function 1 which is homo-
geneous of degree minus one in p. It follows that
V 1( p;x1) = V 1(^ p;x1) , 1( p) = 1(^ p): (35)






















V 1(;1). Consequently, preferences are homothetic.
If preferences are homothetic, V 1(p;x) = 1 
1(p)x1

where 1 is homogeneous of
degree one, so V 1 is homothetic in p. Consequently, B is homothetic in p and the reversal
test is satised.
The result of Theorem 4 is not surprising if we realize that an individual index, dened
analogously to the common-scaling index, is equal to the ratio of the expenditures needed
to achieve the pre-change utility level of utility at pa and pb. To see this, note that the
index for person 1 satises I1(pb;pa;x1) =  if and only if V 1(pb;x1) = V 1(pa;x1) = ub
1.
It follows that x1 = E1(ub
1;pa) where E1 is the expenditure function that corresponds to
V 1. Because x1 = E1(pb;x1),  = I1(pb;pa;x1) = E1(ub
1;pa)=E1(ub
1;pb): Thus Theorem 4
corresponds to the standard proofs that show that individual homotheticity is necessary and
sucient for satisfaction of the reversal and circular tests (Eichhorn [1978, ch. 3]).






2 if i = 1;
(p)xi if i = 2;:::;n,
(38)












7In this example, individual preferences are identical and homothetic. B is clearly not homo-
thetic in x but it is homothetic in p. To see this, note that















If ( p) = (^ p), (40) is satised and, because B(p;x) increases whenever (p) increases, there
are no other solutions. Because  is homogeneous of degree minus one,
( p) = (^ p) , ( p) = (^ p) (41)
for all  2 R++, B is homothetic in p.













+ i(p); if  = 0.
(42)





In this example, individual preferences may dier and are not homothetic unless i(p) is
independent of p. B is homothetic in p if and only if
Pn
i=1 i(p) is independent of p. To see
this, note that, if that condition obtains and  6= 0,



































 2 R++, which implies B( p;x) = B(^ p;x) so B is homothetic in p. A similar argument
covers the case  = 0.











8individual cost-of-living indexes are given by
Ii(pa;pb;xi) =
(pb)xi + i(pb)   i(pa)
(pa)xi
; (48)





















which is the share-weighted sum of the individual indexes. Consequently, the plutocratic
index is a special case of the common-scaling index, given appropriate social-evaluation
and individual utility functions.2 This index satises the reversal and circular tests if and
only if
Pn
i=1 i(p) is independent of p. In this formulation, individuals are identical at
the margin: increases of decreases in expenditure change demands equally. This restriction
(quasihomotheticity) is not supported by the data.
It might be interesting to know when the common-scaling index is independent of all
individual expenditures. A characterization is provided by Theorem 5.
Theorem 5: A common-scaling index I satises the reversal test and is independent of
expenditures if and only if there exists a continuous function  :R++ ! R, homogeneous
of degree one, and a continuous function ~ B: (Rm
++)  Rn
++ ! R, decreasing in its rst
argument, increasing in x, and homogeneous of degree zero, such that B can be written as





Proof: Suppose I satises the reversal test and is independent of x, so it can be written as
I(pa;pb;x) = ~ I(pa;pb) for all pa;pb 2 Rm
++. By Theorem 3, I and ~ I satisfy the circular test
so, for all pa;pb;p 2 Rm
++,
~ I(pa;pb) = ~ I(pa;p)~ I(p;pb): (51)











Because I and, therefore, ~ I are homogeneous of degree one in pa,   is homogeneous of degree
one.
2 See Crossley and Pendakur [2009].
9I(pa;pb;x) =  if and only if
B(pb;x) = B(pa;x): (54)
















Dening ~ B( (p);x) by the right side of (56), (50) is satised. Because B is homogeneous
of degree zero and   is homogeneous of degree one, ~ B is homogeneous of degree zero, and
necessity is demonstrated.
















for all x 2 Rn
++, where the last term follows from homogeneity of ~ B. It follows that




which is independent of x.
In the example of (42) and (43), p is separable, so separability of p does not, in general,
imply that B is homothetic in x.
The Pollak index satises the reversal and circular tests if the reference level of social
welfare is constant. If, however, the index is computed using the before-change level of social
welfare, the tests are not satised in general unless the index is independent of the level of
social welfare (Blackorby and Donaldson [1983]). A similar observation applies to individual
indexes dened as the ratio of expenditures needed to achieve a xed utility level at prices
pa and pb.
3. Individual Homotheticity
Individual price indexes are satisfy the reversal and circular tests if and only if preferences














10where i(p) = 1=i(p),

V i, i and i are continuous,

V i is increasing, i is homogeneous of
degree one, and i is homogeneous of degree minus one. We assume, in addition, that there
is a scaling of each i or, equivalently, i, such that
















The term i(p)yi or, equivalently, yi=i(p) can be regarded as person i's real expenditure.
If two people have the same real expenditures, (60) implies they are equally well o.









The social-welfare function can be written as























To discuss the consequences of the reversal and circular tests, let yi = Y i(p;xi) =




y = Y (p;x) j p 2 R++g: (64)
y can be thought of as a vector of real expenditures, and Y(x) is the set of possible values
for y given x. Because ai(p)xi = ai(p=)xi; Y(x) is a cone (if y 2 Y(x), then y 2 Y(x) for
all positive ). If all preferences are identical, Y(x) is a ray for each x. On the other hand,
if m  n, and i(p) = 1=pi for all i, Y(x) = Rn




Reversibility has the consequence that, for each x, the restriction of  W to Y(x) is
homothetic.
Theorem 6: Suppose individual preferences are homothetic and (60) holds. If a common-
scaling index I satises the reversal test, then, for all x 2 Rn
++,  y; ^ y 2 Y(x), and  2 R++,
 W( y) =  W(^ y) )  W( y) =  W(^ y): (65)





V n are the same, however, the choice is not arbitrary because 1(p)x1;:::;n(p)xn
must be indexes of individual standards of living that can be compared interpersonally.
11Proof: If  y; ^ y 2 Y(x), there exist  p; ^ p 2 Rm
++ such that  y = Y ( p;x) and ^ y = Y (^ p;x). By







Y (^ p;x) ,  W
 





for all  2 R++. Because Y (p=;x) = Y (p;x), for all (p;x),








,  W( y) =  W(^ y) (67)
for all  2 R++.
By itself, Theorem 6 does not imply that  W is homothetic. Suppose individual utility
functions satisfy i(p) = (p), i = 1;:::;n, so that preferences are identical and homothetic,
with










, which is a set of scalar multiples of
the vector x and is, therefore, a ray. In that case, the common-scaling index is the common
individual index, the property of equation (65) is trivially satised, but  W is not homothetic.
To show that satisfaction of the reversal test implies that  W is homothetic, a preference
diversity condition is needed. In the denition, an -neighbourhood of y is fz j jjz xjj < g,
 2 R++.
Preference Diversity:
(a) For all p;x 2 Rm+n
++ , Y(x) contains an -neighbourhood of Y (p;x) for some  2
R++;
(b) For all  y; ^ y 2 Rn
++, there exist x1;:::;xR 2 Rn
++ and y1;:::;yR+1 2 Rn
++, such
that
y1 =  y 2 Y(x1) (69)
yr 2 Y(xr 1) \ Y(xr);r 2 f2;:::;Rg; (70)
and
yR+1 = ^ y 2 Y(xR): (71)
Part (a) of preference diversity implies that the sets Y(x) are thick. This means that changes
in prices alone are capable of moving y in any direction. For that reason, it implies that the
the number of goods is no smaller than the number of people (m  n). Part (b) ensures that
any two values of y can be connected with overlapping sets Y(x1);:::;Y(xR). Because the
xs and ys in Part (b) are not required to be distinct, the case in which there exists x 2 Rn
++
such that  y; ^ y 2 Y (x) is covered. It may be true that one part of the axiom implies the other
but we have been unable to prove it.
Part (b) of preference diversity is sucient to extend to result of Theorem 6 to all of
Rn
++.
12Theorem 7: Suppose individual preferences are homothetic, satisfy preference diversity,
and (60) holds. Then a common-scaling index I satises the reversal test if and only if  W
is homothetic.
Proof: Suppose I satises preference diversity and the reversal test. And consider any  y; ^ y 2
Rn
++ with  W( y) =  W(^ y). Then, using part (b) of preference diversity, dene ~ yr = ~ yr such
that  W(~ yr) =  W(^ y), r = 2;:::;R. Because Y(x) is a cone for each x, ~ yr 2 Y(xr)\Y(xr+1),
r 2 f1;:::;R   1g. Repeated application of the result of Theorem 6 yields
 W( y) =  W(~ y2) (72)
for all  2 R++, and
 W(~ yr) =  W(~ yr+1); (73)
r = 1;:::;R. (72) and (73) together imply
 W( y) =  W(^ y) (74)
for all  2 R++.
Suciency is immediate.
Any homothetic  W, including the members of the S-Gini family of social-welfare func-
tions, is sucient.4 If  W is homothetic, B must be separately homothetic in p and x. This
observation is stated in a corollary to Theorem 7.
Corollary 7: Suppose individual preferences are homothetic and satisfy preference diver-
sity. Then a common-scaling index I satises the reversal test if and only if the Bergson-
Samuelson indirect B is homothetic in prices and homothetic in expenditures.
If  W is homothetic, the index takes on a simple form. The equally-distributed equivalent
real expenditure  (EDERE) for real-expenditure vector y is that level of expenditure which,
if experienced by everyone, is as good as the actual distribution. Thus,  = (y), where
:Rn
++ ! R is dened by
 W(1n) =  W(y): (75)
 is ordinally equivalent to  W and, because  W is homothetic,  is homogeneous of degree
one.5 In addition, if every person has the same real expenditure, the EDERE is equal to it.
Let yb = Y (pb;x) and ya = Y (pa;x). Because  is ordinally equivalent to  W, I(pa;pb;x) = 





4 See Donaldson and Weymark [1980].





= (y), and 0 = (y) = (y).
13Thus the index measures the percentage gain or loss in EDERE. The Atkinson [1970]-Kolm
[1969]-Sen [1973] index of real-expenditure inequality  is given by T:Rn
++ ! R, where




where M(y) is the mean of the elements of y.6 Homogeneity of degree one of  implies that










The index is positive (negative) if a price change decreases (increases) mean real expenditure,
inequality constant, or if a change increases (decreases) inequality, mean real expenditure
constant.
Theorem 8 nds the conditions that make the index independent of all expenditures.
In the proof, the unit vector e 2 E = fe 2 Rn
++ j jjejj = 1g, and ei is a unit vector with
ei
i = 1 and ei
k = 0, k 6= i.
Theorem 8: Suppose individual preferences are homothetic, satisfy preference diversity,
and (60) holds. A common-scaling index satises the reversal test and is independent of

























































for some function f. Dening zi = i(x), i = 1;:::;n, (82) becomes
(z1x1;:::;znxn) = (p)f(x) =  (z)f(x); (83)
6 For a survey of ethical indexes of inequality, see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [1999].




= (p). Part (a) of preference diversity implies that,
 y =  z x can be moved through an -neighbourhood by changing p, which changes z,  x
constant. Each element of the set












is a feasible value of z, x =  x. If z is restricted to move in direction e 2 E only, then, writing




e1 x1;:::;en xn)jj < 
	
(86)
is a feasible value for . Because y =  z x if and only if  = 0, the possible values for 
comprise an open interval which includes zero. If, for example, e = ei, the set of possible
values for  is the interval ( = xi;= xi). Locally, therefore, each element of z can be moved
independently. It follows that, in an -neighbourhood of each y 2 Rn
++, (83) is a Pexider










 c > 0. Because  is symmetric and increasing, the kis must be equal and and positive.
Homogeneity of degree one of  further requires ki = 1=n, i = 1;:::;n. Because (1n) = 
for all  2 R++,  c = 1. yielding (79) which, in turn, implies (80). Because x can take on
any value in Rn
++, the -neighbourhoods overlap, and (87) can be extended to all of Rn
++.
Suciency is immediate.
The Cobb-Douglas indexes are not the only reasonable indexes. There are good reasons
to suppose that the social-welfare function is additively separable.7 If  is continuous,















i if r = 0.
(88)
The function exhibits inequality aversion in real expenditures if and only if the parameter
r < 1. The index is easy to compute using (76), with
I(pa;pb;x) =
8
> > > > > > <





































if r = 0.
(89)
7 See Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2005, ch. 4].
8 See Eichhorn [1978, ch. 2] for a proof.
15Blackorby and Donaldson [1983] solved a very dierent problem, but their indexes are
related to the ones found in this article. One of their cases is the Cobb-Douglas index
of Theorem 8. Another is related to the mean-of-order r indexes r 6= 0. but lacks the
expenditure terms. This occurs because of the minimizing implicit in Pollak's index.
4. Approximation of the Common-Scaling Index
The individual cost-of-living index satises the reversal test if and only if individual pref-
erences are homothetic. Theorem 2 shows that if the common-scaling index satises the
reversal test if and only if B is homothetic in p. Equivalently, the common-scaling index
I satises the reversal test if and only if I is homogeneous of degree minus one in pb (it is
homogeneous of degree one in pa regardless of whether it satises the reversal test). Homo-
theticity of B in p does not require individual preferences to be homothetic. In this section,
we consider how to approximate I when when B is homothetic in p. In addition, we consider
the empirical magnitude of these restrictions in a Monte Carlo experiment.






and let normalized reference proportionate welfare weights, i, be those evaluated at pb (so
that i = i(pb;x)). Let w = (w1;:::;wm) be the m vector of budget shares where wj is
dened as the share of total expenditure commanded by the jth commodity. Let wi be the
budget-share vector of the ith household, and let wi = wi(pb;xi) be the value of the budget
share vector for household i facing 'before' prices pb and expenditure xi. The following
proposition, reproduced from Crossley and Pendakur [2009], establishes the second-order
approximation of the common-scaling index. In the theorem statement, tildes (with no
subscript i, and no superscript) denote i-weighted averages.





, reference budget shares, wi, and their price and expenditure
derivatives, the second-order approximation of the common-scaling index  is



































Consider rst the restriction that the common-scaling index is homogeneous of degree
 1 in pb. Note that the rst-order part of the approximation, dp0 e w, satises this homo-
geneity by construction. Given, this, the second-order part of the approximation must be
homogeneous of degree 0 in pb in order for the approximation as a whole to be homogeneous
of degree 1 in pb. Homogeneity of degree zero is equivalent to

 + lnpa   lnpb
0 h
e w e w0   diag (e w) + g rlnp0w + g rlnxw e w0 + e 
i












This holds if and only if the row and column sums of the matrix in the square brack-
ets are zero. Note that [e w e w0   diag (e w)] have row and column sums of zero due to the
fact that budget shares sum to 1. Note also that since the budget-share vector every-
where sums to 1, the sum of its derivatives with respect to any single argument over the
m budget-shares is zero, so that 0 g rlnp0w = 00
m and 0 g rlnxw = 0. Further, since indi-
vidual preferences satisfy homogeneity in p;x, g rlnp0w + g rlnxw  = 0m. Consequently,
h
e w e w0   diag (e w) + g rlnp0w + g rlnxw e w0 + e 
i
has row and column sums of zero if and only
if e  has row and column-sums of zero.
Since wi sums to 1, and e  
PN
i=1 wirlnp0i(pb;x), the restriction is satised if and only
if rlnp0i(pb;x) = 0m. In this case, e  = 0, and the second-order approximation satisfying
homogeneity of degree  1 in pb is given by





e w e w0   diag (e w) + g rlnp0w + g rlnxw e w0
i
dp: (98)
Consider next the restriction that individual utility functions are homothetic in p. In
this case, it is well known that all individuals would have rlnxwi(pb;xi) = 0, and thus
g rlnxw = 0; (99)
leading to a second order approximation given by





e w e w0   diag (e w) + g rlnp0w
i
dp: (100)
17To sum up, if we restrict e  = 0, then the second-order approximation of the common-
scaling index will satisfy the reversibility test, and if we further restrict g rlnxw = 0, then
each individual cost-of-living index will satisfy the reversibility test. Now we consider the
empirical magnitude of these restrictions.
5. Monte Carlo Experiment
Here, we set up an experiment to establish the relative size of these two restrictions in a
plausible economic environment. We consider the same environment as Crossley and Pen-
dakur (2009), which uses the data and empirical specication developed in Pendakur (2002).
We consider an environment with preference heterogeneity, driven by a single demographic
characteristic z. To mimic the data used by Pendakur (2002), we use a single demographic
characteristic, the number of household members, and draw 1000 values of log-expenditure
and the number of household members from independent standard normals with means of
4:54 and 2:17, respectively, and standard deviations of 0:65 and 1:31, respectively. The
number of household members is discretized to 1;2;3:::.
For consumer preferences, we use the 9-good parametric demand system estimated by
Pendakur (2002) in which all households have single demographic characteristic, z, equal to
the number of household members and have Quadratic Almost Ideal (QAI) indirect utility
(see Banks, Blundell and Lewbel 1997) given by:
V (p;x;z) = h

lnx   lna(p;z)
b(p) + q(p)(lnx   lna(p;z))

(101)
where h is monotonically increasing. Here, we use the following functional forms for a, b,
and q:







lnb(p) = lnp0b; (103)
and
q(p) = lnp0q; (104)
where all parameter values are taken from Pendakur (2002, Table 3) and 0a = 1, 0b = 0q =
0, 0D = 0A0 = 0Az = 0m, A0 = A0
0 and Az = A0
z. For convenience, let the reference price
vector be pb = 1m  100 and let d0 =  ln100. Thus, lna(pb;z) = lnb(pb) = q(pb) = 0.
In this model, preference heterogeneity is entirely captured by z. Thus, we can think
of this utility function as of the following form:
V i(p;xi) = h

lnx   lnai(p)
b(p) + q(p)(lnx   lnai(p))

: (105)
If b(p) = q(p) = 0, then preferences are homothetic and heterogeneous across individuals, and
fall into the class studied in Section 3 and given by equation (48). If q(p) = 0 but b(p) 6= 0,
then preferences fall into Deaton and Muelbauer's Almost Ideal class (logarithmic Gorman
18Polar form) and have preference heterogeneity coming through level eects in budget shares.
If q(p) 6= 0, then budget shares are quadratic in the log of expenditure and fall into the
Quadratic Almost Ideal class of Banks, Blundell and Lewbel (1997).
For this indirect utility function, reference utility is
ui = V (pb;xi;zi) = h(lnxi   dzi): (106)
Consequently, the function h determines the marginal utility of money. If h(t) = t, then
V (pb;x;z) = lnx dzi and, at a vector of unit prices, the marginal utility of a proportionate
increase in money is constant. If, in contrast, h(t) = exp(t), then V (pb;x;z) = x=exp(dzi),
so that at a vector of unit prices, the marginal utility of money is constant (1=exp(dzi)),
and the marginal utility of a proportionate increase in money is proportional to expenditure
(x=exp(dzi)). Since h is a monotonic transformation of utility, it drops out of all calculations
of behavioural responses, but structure on h is required to compute welfare weights.
For the social welfare function, we use the generalized utilitarian form with
W (u1;:::;uN) =
PN
i=1 g(ui). This yields utilitarianism, which is neutral to inequality of util-
ities, if g(ui) = ui. It yields social welfare which is somewhat averse to inequality in utilities
if g(ui) = lnui and strongly averse if g(ui) =  (ui)
 1. These welfare functions correspond
to the Mean-of-Order r or Atkinson, class of social welfare functions with social welfare
ordinally equivalent to the arithmetic mean of utility (if g(ui) = ui), the geometric mean of
utility (if g(ui) = lnui) or the harmonic mean of utility (if g(ui) =  (ui)
 1). Obviously,
the indirect welfare function, B, is the compound function W
 
V 1 (p;x1);:::;V n (p;xn)

.
Now, we need to evaluate the sizes of g rlnxw e w0 and e  in the context of the second-order
approximation. Let e S denote the second order part of the approximation, excluding e :
e S = e w e w0   diag (e w) + g rlnp0w + g rlnxw e w0 (107)
Since the second-order approximation of the common-scaling index uses quadratic forms,
we compare the sizes of dp0 g rlnxw e w0dp and dp0e dp to dp0e Sdp over many random draws of dp.
We draw 1000 observations of the vector dp from independent random uniform distributions,
each with minimum  0:45 and maximum 0:55. The uniform distribution chosen has small
but positive mean in order to reect underlying price growth. The independence of prices
from each other allows for lots of relative price variation. For each draw, dpt, t = 1;:::;1000,
we compute the ratios
  dpt0e dptdpt0e Sdpt
   and
  
dpt0 g rlnxw e w0dpt
dpt0e Sdpt
  . We use the absolute value to
account for the fact that this ratio may be positive or negative for dierent price vectors,
because the numerator and denominator need not have the same sign. Table 1 presents the




 for cases with varying marginal utility, so-
cial welfare functions and preference structures. (Recall that QAI demands have quadratic
Engel curves and AI demands have linear Engel curves.) Note that the random number
generator seed is held constant across these experiments, so that the randomly generated
population fxi;zig
n
i=1 is identical across rows in the table.
19The main lessons from Table 1 are that: (1) e  is smaller than g rlnxw e w0 under plausible
circumstances; and (2) although the non-homotheticity of B, captured by e , may be thought
of as so small that it may be ignored, the non-homotheticity of V , captured by g rlnxw e w0, is
probably not so small that it can be ignored.
The average of the 1000 values of the

 dpt0e dpt=dpt0e Sdpt

  takes its largest value of 0:084
for the common-scaling index with g(ui) = lnui and h(t) = exp(t) combined with QAI
preferences. This suggests that even in this case the term driven by e  is at least an order
of magnitude smaller than the second-order part of the approximation as a whole. Indeed,
e  can be exactly zero under plausible circumstances. When utility is Almost Ideal and
marginal utility is log-money metric and welfare is utilitarian, e  is exactly zero. When





is less than 1=20th. So, imposing reversibility in the approximation of the common-scaling
index by ignoring the trailing term e  may not be too damaging in empirical work.
The term capturing non-homotheticities of individual preferences, E
h
 






is based on the income eects in budget share equations, g rlnxw . Ignoring this is more
costly. Between one-tenth and one-half of the second-order part of the approximation is
driven by the value of g rlnxw e w. Thus, we conclude that it is prudent to include this term
in empirical work.
The bottom line here is as follows. A huge body of evidence tells us that individual
preferences do not satisfy homotheticity, so that individual cost-of-living indices should not
satisfy the reversal test. The common-scaling index also satises the reversal test if individual
preferences satisfy homotheticity. However, restricting the common-scaling index to this case
imposes large costs on the accuracy of the empirical estimates. In the theoretical part of
this paper, we show that the common-scaling index satises the reversal test if and only if a
much weaker condition, homotheticity of the indirect welfare function, holds. Restricting the
common-scaling index to this case imposes some cost on the accuracy of empirical estimates,
but, in our view, this loss of accuracy is small relative to the gain of having a social cost-of-
living index that satises the reversal and circular tests.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this note, we demonstrate that the common-scaling social cost-of-living index satises the
reversal or circular tests if and only if the Bergson-Samuelson indirect social-welfare function
B is homothetic in prices, which provides a simple test for estimation. Equivalently, the index
satises either test if and only if it is homogeneous of degree minus one in its second argument.
This condition does not require homotheticity of individual preferences and accommodates
a wide range of social-welfare functions.
There are cases in which the index is independent of individual expenditures. That
property is satised if and only if prices are separable in B.
20If individual preferences are homothetic, a preference diversity axiom is satised, and
the social-welfare function is additively separable (in utilities), the index can be written as in
(89), which is the ratio of mean-of-order-r equally distributed real expenditures before and
after the price change. If parameter r is less than one, the social-evaluation function exhibits
aversion to inequality of real expenditures. And, if r is zero, the common-scaling index is
independent of individual expenditures. We know, however, that individual preferences
are not homothetic, and this suggests that the more general formulation should be used if
resources for estimation are available. The social-welfare function need not be additively
separable as long as the Bergson-Samuelson indirect is homothetic in prices and homothetic
in expenditures.
In order to satisfy the tests, the indirect Bergson-Samuelson social-welfare function
must be homothetic in prices, a restriction which aects estimation. Because available data
are attached to households rather than individuals, estimation should be able to incorporate
the fact of diverse household types. Crossley and Pendakur [2009] employ equivalence scales
to deal with that problem. Building on their analysis, we have shown, in Section 5, that
the the consequence for estimation of the restriction that B is homothetic in prices is small
enough to be ignored.
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